The North Carolina Republican Party and individual voters brought suit in Federal District Court, alleging that the plan constituted an unconstitutional political gerrymander under Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109 (1986). Allen v. State Board of Elections(1969) (emphasis added). 92-357 Argued: April 20, 1993 Decided: June 28, 1993. By a 2-to-1 vote, the District Court also dismissed the complaint against the state appellees. It also will be true where the minority population is not scattered but, for reasons unrelated to racefor example incumbency protection-the State would rather not create the majority-minority district in its most "obvious" location.10 When, as is the case here, the creation of. Statement 89a-90a; see also Brief for Appellants 31-32. Such districting might have both the intent and effect of "packing" members of the group so as to deprive them of any influence in other districts. See, e. g., Croson, 488 U. S., at 491-493 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J., joined by REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, J. Respondent Argument (Reno) 1. At issue in Wright were four districts contained in a New York apportionment statute. Shaw V. Reno Civil Liberties vs Civil Rights 17th Amendment 2nd Amendment 3rd Amendment 4th Amendment Bostock v Clayton County District of Columbia v. Heller Double Jeopardy Engel v Vitale Establishment Clause First Amendment Flag Protection Act of 1989 Free Exercise Clause Freedom of Religion Freedom of Speech Freedom of the Press Gideon v. If a reapportionment plan creates a district that is so irregular that the only reason for its creation is to separate voters based on race, then an Equal Protection challenge against that plan is valid. The Court expresses no view on whether appellants successfully could have challenged a district such as that suggested by the Attorney General or whether their complaint stated a claim under other constitutional provisions. Croson Co.(1989) (city contracting);Wygant v. Jackson Bd. It is ironic that it does so when white voters challenge a law that would have North Carolina send a black representative to Congress for the first time since Reconstruction, here is no constitutional requirement of compactness or contiguity for districts. This question also need not be decided at this stage of the litigation. In fact, our country's long and persistent history of racial discrimination in voting-as well as our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, which always has reserved the strictest scrutiny for discrimination on the basis of race, see supra, at 642-644-would seem to compel the opposite conclusion. The distinction is untenable. It rejected the argument that race-conscious redistricting to benefit minority voters is per se unconstitutional. The plan amounts to unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of race 3.District 12 is not compact or contiguous which are criteria for district maps 4. of Gal. (b) Classifications of citizens based solely on race are by their nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality, because they threaten to stigmatize persons by reason of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial hostility. The Cultural Landscape: An Introduction to Human Geography, AP Edition, Elliot Aronson, Robin M. Akert, Samuel R. Sommers, Timothy D. Wilson, Statistical Techniques in Business and Economics, Douglas A. Lind, Samuel A. Wathen, William G. Marchal, Chapter 14 and 15 Study Guide 8th BJU History. In its 1993 decision, the Supreme Court agreed, ruling that race cannot be the predominant factor in creating districts. H. Lefler & A. Newsom, The History of a Southern State: North Carolina 18-22 (3d ed. Legislation that classifies a person or group of people solely based on their race is, by its nature, a threat to a system that strives to achieve equality, the majority opined. The three-judge District Court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the federal appellees. claim in UJO was that the State had "violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by deliberately revising its reapportionment plan along racial lines." The black population is relatively dispersed; blacks constitute a majority of the general population in only 5 of the State's 100 counties. Post, at 671 (WHITE, J., dissenting); see also post, at 684 (SOUTER, J., dissenting). See UJO, 430 U. S., at 165-166 (plurality opinion of WHITE, J., joined by STEVENS and REHNQUIST, JJ. See App. As Justice Douglas explained in his dissent inWright v. Rockefellernearly 30 years ago: "Here the individual is important, not his race, his creed, or his color. 506 U. S. 801 (1992). Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters-a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire. The shapes of the two districts in question were quite controversial. We also do not decide whether appellants' complaint stated a claim under constitutional provisions other than the Fourteenth Amendment. Forty of North Carolina's one hundred counties are covered by 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U. S. C. 1973c, which prohibits a jurisdiction subject to its provisions from implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" without federal authorization, ibid. Gomillion thus supports appellants' contention that district lines obviously drawn for the purpose of separating voters by race require careful scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause regardless of the motivations underlying their adoption. Significant changes in the area of redistricting and gerrymandering, 1. 808 F. Supp. Appellants stated an equal protection claim by alleging that North Carolina's reapportionment scheme was so irrational on its face that it could be understood only as an effort to segregate voters based on race, and that separation lacks sufficient justification. 3 The majority does not acknowledge that we require such a showing from plaintiffs who bring a vote dilution claim under 2 of the Voting Rights Act. shape of the district lines could "be explained only in racial terms." Two others concluded that the statute did not minimize or cancel out a minority group's voting strength and that the State's intent to comply with the Voting Rights Act, as interpreted by the Department of Justice, "foreclose[d] any finding that [the State] acted with the invidious purpose of discriminating against white voters." 91-2038, p. 43a (Complaint in Pope v. Blue, No. That sort of race consciousness does not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination. Complaint' 29, App. There is thus no theoretical inconsistency in having two distinct approaches to equal protection analysis, one for cases of electoral districting and one for most other types of state governmental decisions. See n. 7, supra. A second distinction between districting and most other governmental decisions in which race has figured is that those other decisions using racial criteria characteristically occur in circumstances in which the use of race to the advantage of one person is necessarily at the obvious expense of a member of a different race. A state must prove a compelling interest in order to survive a legal challenge to the redistricting plan. That claim, the majority concluded, was barred by United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144 (1977) (UJO). By this, I meant that the group must exhibit "strong indicia of lack of political power and the denial of fair representation," so that it could be said that it has "essentially been shut out of the political process." (a) The District Court properly dismissed the claims against the federal appellees. Post, at 668 (WHITE, J., dissenting). "As long as members of racial groups have [a] commonality of interest" and "racial bloc voting takes place," he argues, "legislators will have to take race into account" in order to comply with the Voting Rights Act. can imagine would be the preservation of "sound districting principles," UJO, 430 U. S., at 168, such as compactness and contiguity. It deemed appellants' claim under the Fifteenth Amendment essentially subsumed within their related claim under the Equal Protection Clause. The other part of the majority's explanation of its holding is related to its simultaneous discomfort and fascination with irregularly shaped districts. The existence of bizarre and uncouth district boundaries is powerful evidence of an ulterior purpose behind the shaping of those boundaries-usually a purpose to advantage the political party in control of the districting process. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 161-162 (1977) (UJO) (pluralityopinion of WHITE, J., joined by Brennan, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ. The difference between constitutional and unconstitutional gerrymanders has nothing to do with whether they are based on assumptions about the groups they affect, but whether their purpose is to enhance the power of the group in control of the districting process at the expense of any minority group, and thereby to strengthen the unequal distribution of electoral power. Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent. Id., at 56-58. v. EVAN MILLIGAN, ET AL. Accord, Washington v. Seattle School Dist. 14, 27-29. in relevant part). This is altogether antithetical to our system of representative democracy. The "historic and present condition" of the Mexican-American community, id., at 767, a status of cultural and economic marginality, id., at 768, as well as the legislature's unresponsiveness to the group's interests, id., at 768-769, justified the conclusion that MexicanAmericans were "'effectively removed from the political processes,'" and "invidiously excluded from effective participation in political life," id., at 769. Hirabayas hi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943). Laws that explicitly distinguish between individuals on racial grounds fall within the core of that prohibition. Classifications of citizens on the basis of race "are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality." See 425 U. S., at 142, n. 14. We noted probable jurisdiction. the democratic ideal, it should find no footing here." 5-4 decision for Shaw majority opinion by Sandra Day O'Connor. See UJO, supra, at 165 (plurality opinion). The three-judge District Court granted the federal appellees' motion to dismiss. As a result of the 1990 census, North Carolina became entitled to a 12th seat in the United States House of Representatives. I nevertheless agree that the conscious use of race in redistricting does not violate the Equal Protection Clause unless the effect of the redistricting plan is to deny a particular group equal access to the political process or to minimize its voting strength unduly. Carr. Cf. It is unnecessary for us to decide whether or how a reapportionment plan that, on its face, can be explained in nonracial terms successfully could be challenged. Accordingly, they held that plaintiffs were not entitled to relief under the Constitution's, NORTH CAROLINA CONGRESSIONAL PLAN Chapter 7 of the 1991 Session Laws (1991 Extra Session). income. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339, 340 (1960). Accordingly, the Court held that such schemes violate the Fourteenth Amendment when they are adopted with a discriminatory purpose and have the effect of diluting minority voting strength. Shaw's group claimed that drawing districts based on race violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U. S. 474, 484, n. 2 (1990) ("[A] prosecutor's assumption that a black juror may be presumed to be partial simply because he is black violates the Equal Protection. 7, that included a second majority-black district. I add these comments to emphasize that the two critical facts in this case are undisputed: First, the shape of District 12 is so bizarre that it must have been drawn for the purpose of either advantaging or disadvantaging a cognizable group of voters; and, second, regardless of that shape, it was drawn for the purpose of facilitating the election of a second black representative from North Carolina. the Attorney General's satisfaction that its proposed redistricting had neither the purpose nor the effect of abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. The purposes of favoring minority voters and complying with the Voting Rights Act are not discriminatory in the constitutional sense, the court reasoned, and majority-minority districts have an impermissibly discriminatory effect only when they unfairly dilute or cancel out white voting strength. If the allegation of racial gerrymandering remains uncontradicted, the District Court further must determine whether the North Carolina plan is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. Id., at 154, n. 14 (quoting Brief for Petitioners, O. T. 1976, No. the group claimed that the districts were racial gerrymanders that violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 144 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting). The determinative consideration for the Court was that the law, though ostensibly race neutral, on its face "embod[ied] no exercise of judgment and rest[ed] upon no discernible reason" other than to circumvent the prohibitions of the Fifteenth Amendment. Did North Carolina residents claim that the 1990 redistricting plan discriminated on the basis of race raise a valid constitutional issue under the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? Where members of a racial minority group vote as a cohesive unit, practices such as multimember or atlarge electoral systems can reduce or nullify minority voters' ability, as a group, "to elect the candidate of their choice." These lawmakers are quite aware that the districts they create will have a white or a black majority; and with each new district comes the unavoidable choice as to the racial composition of the district." Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 4 The majority's use of "segregation" to describe the effect of districting here may suggest that it carries effects comparable to school segregation making it subject to like scrutiny. (referring variously to "strict scrutiny," "the standard of review employed in Wygant," and "heightened scrutiny"); id., at 520 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment) ("strict scrutiny"); id., at 535 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (classifications" 'must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives'" (quoting Regents of Univ. With him on the briefs were Michael F. Easley, Attorney General of North Carolina, Edwin M. Speas, Jr., Senior, Deputy Attorney General, and Norma S. Harrell and Tiare B. Smiley, Special Deputy Attorneys General. Bush administration rejected this plan on the grounds that it gave blacks insufficient congressional representation. Shaw v. Reno Jennifer Denise Rogers . This small sample only begins to scratch the surface of the problems raised by the majority's test. tutes an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. In Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347 (1915), the Court invalidated under the Fifteenth Amendment a statute that imposed a literacy requirement on voters but contained a "grandfather clause" applicable to individuals and their lineal descendants entitled to vote "on [or prior to] January 1, 1866." *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the American Jewish Congress by Marc D. Stern and Lois C. Waldman; for the Republican National Committee by Benjamin L. Ginsberg and Michael A. Hess; and for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. The Attorney General, acting through the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division, interposed a formal objection to the General Assembly's plan. Redistricting advantage for blacks faces more scrutiny than an advantage for a non-minority. Shaw appealed. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 141 (1976). Five of the eight Justices who participated in the decision resolved the case under the framework the Court previously had adopted for vote-dilution cases. 808 F. Given two districts drawn on similar, race-based grounds, the one does not become more injurious than the other simply by virtue of being snakelike, at least so far as the Constitution is concerned and absent any evidence of differential racial impact. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268; Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. of Oral Arg. Where was the Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied? This new plant is expected to generate aftertax cash flows of$9.4 million in perpetuity. The majority attempts to distinguish UJO by imagining a heretofore unknown type of constitutional claim. e., an intent to aggravate "the unequal distribution of electoral power." With these considerations in mind, we have limited such claims by insisting upon a showing that "the political processes were not equally open to participation by the group in question-that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice." Id., at 139. Nothing in the decision precludes white voters (or voters of any other race) from bringing the analytically distinct claim that a reapportionment plan rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification. 1. The second type of unconstitutional practice is that which "affects the political strength of various groups," Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 83 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment), in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. White v. Regester, supra, at 766. At some points the district was no wider than Interstate 85, prompting one state legislator to remark that if "you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district." App. In light of this background, it strains credulity to suggest that North Carolina's purpose in creating a second majorityminority district was to discriminate against members of the majority group by "impair[ing] or burden[ing their] opportunity to participate in the political process." For the reasons stated by JUSTICE WHITE, the decision of the District Court should be affirmed. Did the North Carolina residents who objected to the majority-minority district raise a valid question under the Fourteenth Amendment? See ante, at 642, 649, 652, 657-658. Id., at 349. ", ity voters-surely they cannot complain of discriminatory treatment.6. In 1991, a group of white voters in North Carolina challenged the state's new congressional district map, which had two "majority-minority" districts. UJO, supra, at 148. Racial classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA. Appellants alleged not that the revised plan constituted a political gerrymander, nor that it violated the "one person, one vote" principle, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 558 (1964), but that the State had created an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. But as JUSTICE WHITE points out, see ante, at 672 (dissenting opinion), and as the Court acknowledges, see ante, at 647, we have held that such principles are not constitutionally required, with the consequence that their absence cannot justify the distinct constitutional regime put in place by the Court today. To begin, the Court's reliance on that case as the font of its novel type of claim is curious. As stated above, five Justices were of the view that, absent any contention that the proposed plan was adopted with the intent, or had the effect, of unduly minimizing the white majority's voting strength, the Fourteenth Amendment was not implicated. That it may be difficult to determine from the face of a single-member districting plan that it makes such a distinction does not mean that a racial gerrymander, once established, should receive less scrutiny than other legislation classifying citizens by race. The shape of the district at issue in this case is indeed so bizarre that few other examples are ever likely to carry the unequivocal implication of impermissible use of race that the Court finds here. Ante, at 652. The Court today chooses not to overrule, but rather to sidestep, UJO. See 808 F. In whatever district, the individual voter has a right to vote in each election, and the election will result in the voter's representation. Under our cases there is in general a requirement that in order to obtain relief under the Fourteenth Amendment, the purpose and effect of the districting must be to devalue the effectiveness of a voter compared to what, as a group member, he would otherwise be able to enjoy. The same principle pertains in nondistricting aspects of voting law, where race-based discrimination places the disfavored voters at the disadvantage of exclusion from the franchise without any alternative benefit. The state appellees assert that the deliberate creation of majority-minority districts is the most precise way-indeed the only effective way-to overcome the effects of racially polarized voting. Nor is it a particularly accurate description of what has occurred. Gomillion is consistent with this view. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 291 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The question before us is whether appellants have stated a cognizable claim. depends on these twin elements. See, e. g., ante, at 639-641.4 A contrary conclusion could only be described as perverse. The Court, while seemingly agreeing with this position, warns that the State's redistricting effort must be "narrowly tailored" to further its interest in complying with the law. At one point the district remains contiguous only because it intersects at a single point with two other districts before crossing over them. 808 F. Finally, like New York, North Carolina reacted by modifying its plan and creating additional majority-minority districts. Instead, the Court creates a new "analytically distinct," ibid., cause of action, the principal element of which is that a districting plan be "so bizarre on its face," ante, at 644, or "irrational on its face," ante, at 652, or "extremely irregular on its face," ante, at 642, that it "rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification," ante, at 652. The United States Supreme Court ruled that federal courts could hear and rule on cases in which plaintiffs allege that re-apportionment plans violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . See, e. g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S. 1, 17 (1975); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-766 (1973). The district lines may be drawn, for example, to provide for compact districts of contiguous territory, or to maintain the integrity of political subdivisions. Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society. The fact that a demonstration of discriminatory effect was required in that case was not a function of the kind of claim that was made. The Court today chooses not to overrule, but rather to sidestep,UJO. See, e. g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613 (1982) (at-large system); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980) (same); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973) (multimember districts); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 (1971) (same); see also supra, at 640-641. Nonetheless, the notion that North Carolina's plan, under which whites remain a voting majority in a disproportionate number of congressional districts, and pursuant to which the State has sent its first black representatives since Reconstruction to the United States Congress, might have violated appellants' constitutional rights is both a fiction and a departure from settled equal protection principles. What is the NPV of the new plant? 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